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 Voluntariness
 OF CONSENT TO RESEARCH
 A Conceptual Model
 by
 PAUL S. APPELBAUM,
 CHARLES W. LIDZ, AND
 ROBERT KLITZMAN
 A good deal of policy and practice in human subjects research aims to ensure that when subjects
 consent to research, they do so voluntarily. To date, however, voluntariness and its impairment have been
 poorly conceptualized and studied. The legal doctrine of informed consent could provide a useful model.
 Informed consent to research derives from a legal
 doctrine that calls for potential research subjects
 to have meaningful choice. It comprises three el
 ements: relevant information is provided to a person
 who is competent to make a decision, and who is sit
 uated to do so voluntarily} The first definitive state
 ment of the importance of consent as a prerequisite
 to research participation, the tribunal's decision in
 the Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg, underscored the
 crucial role of voluntariness in that process: "The
 voluntary consent of the human subject is absolute
 ly essential."2 However, existing literature on in
 formed consent has focused extensively on the infor
 mation disclosed and how well it is communicat
 ed?and, more recently, on the theoretical and prac
 tical aspects of the assessment of decisional compe
 tence?while the nature of the requirement of vol
 untariness has yet to be fully explored.3
 Current controversies over the extent to which a
 variety of recruitment approaches may compromise
 voluntary consent to research have raised concerns
 about the topic. Such concerns are usually invoked
 under the rubrics of coercion or undue influence.
 The federal regulations on human subjects research
 refer to both concepts but define neither.4 However,
 the regulations identify several subject groups?in
 cluding children, prisoners, pregnant women, men
 tally disabled persons, and economically or educa
 tionally disadvantaged persons?as "likely to be vul
 nerable to coercion or undue influence." They also
 indicate that a criterion for institutional review
 board approval of such research is that "additional
 safeguards have been included in the study to pro
 Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz, and Robert Klitzman, "Volun
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 tect the rights and welfare of thes<
 subjects."5
 Potentially impaired voluntaries:
 has also been raised as an issue in nu
 merous other contexts in th<
 bioethics literature on consent to re
 search. These include, but are no
 limited to, when:
 1) substantial monetary or other
 compensation is offered in ex
 change for entering a research
 study;6
 2) subjects are recruited by their
 own physicians or in facilities
 where they are receiving care and
 may be hesitant to antagonize care
 givers by refusing to participate,
 especially if they are poor, elderly,
 or suffering from chronic condi
 tions;7
 Regulation of the consent process has necessarily been based on
 a number of presumptions about conditions that may impair
 voluntariness, but few data exist to support either the underlying
 assumptions or the effectiveness of the remedies chosen.
 3) subjects are being recruited
 from traditional societies in inter
 national research and are thought
 to be wholly subordinate to a per
 son in a position of authority (for
 example, a husband or tribal
 leader);8
 4) drug abusers are recruited for
 studies that involve the adminis
 tration of their drug of choice or
 are paid for participation and
 thought likely to use the money to
 purchase drugs;9
 5) involuntarily committed psy
 chiatric or substance abuse patients
 are recruited for research;10 and
 6) patients who otherwise lack ac
 cess to medical care are invited to
 participate in studies that promise
 treatment for their conditions.11
 i A good deal of policy and practice
 regarding human subjects research
 > has been based on assumptions re
 garding situations that may impair
 i voluntariness. Many IRBs have poli
 cies that limit the amount of compen
 t sation that can be offered to subjects,
 although compensation practices vary
 widely even within the United States,
 and investigators are often not al
 lowed to advertise the amount of
 fered.12 Some have suggested that
 physicians not be allowed to recruit
 their own patients as subjects, espe
 cially for studies involving more than
 minimal risk, and anecdotal evidence
 suggests that some IRBs may already
 bar this practice. Federal regulations
 sharply limit the kind of research that
 can be conducted in prisons, mandat
 ing rigorous review even for permit
 ted categories of investigations, such
 as minimal risk studies of criminal be
 havior and incarceration.13 Other
 limitations are placed on research
 with pregnant women and children.14
 And a variety of protections have
 been suggested for subjects in interna
 tional and drug abuse studies, which
 now receive more careful review, in
 substantial part because of concerns
 about coercion.15 However, various
 critics have suggested that almost all
 of these policy initiatives are unneces
 sary or overly paternalistic.16
 Determining exactly how neces
 sary and useful these efforts are to
 protect the voluntariness of consent
 requires a valid way of conceptualiz
 ing voluntariness and a reliable means
 of assessing it. The development of
 just such a widely accepted conceptu
 alization of decisional competence,
 and the subsequent creation of instru
 ments that allow its assessment, has
 opened up research on competence
 and allowed more informed policy
 discussions.17 Until this point, howev
 er, there has been limited conceptual
 ization of what constitutes voluntari
 ness to consent to research (although
 there is helpful work on voluntary
 choice in other contexts), and empiri
 cal studies, for reasons we explore
 below, have been difficult to design
 and conduct.18 Hence, regulation of
 the consent process has necessarily
 been based on a number of presump
 tions about conditions that may im
 pair voluntariness, but few data exist
 to support either the underlying as
 sumptions or the effectiveness of the
 remedies chosen.
 In response to this situation, this
 article, after reviewing the empirical
 literature on voluntariness of consent
 to research, offers a model of volun
 tariness rooted in the doctrine of in
 formed consent, describes the con
 straints on voluntariness that may ap
 pear in the research setting, suggests a
 research agenda to advance our un
 derstanding of voluntariness in prac
 tice, and indicates how the proposed
 model might be operationalized to
 detect problematic restrictions on vol
 untariness in consent to research.
 Studies of Voluntariness
 Only a relatively small body of data exists on voluntariness and
 its constraints in research, and the
 conclusions that can be drawn from
 the literature are limited. This is be
 cause no two studies used the same
 methods, and few employed instru
 mentation whose reliability and valid
 ity are well established. Several studies
 from Africa and Asia reported that
 many subjects believed they were not
 free to make participation decisions
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 or to withdraw from the study.19 Al
 though troubling, these data do not
 indicate whether these beliefs derive
 from confusion among the subjects or
 from intentional behavior by re
 searchers.20 When a question about
 the source of pressure was asked di
 rectly in another African study, 6 per
 cent of respondents cited pressure
 from the research team, 5 percent
 from other doctors or nurses, and 4
 percent from health center staff.
 However, no subjects said that this
 pressure led them to believe that they
 could not refuse to participate.21
 Comparable data from Thailand
 showed that no subjects reported
 pressure from the research staff, and
 just 2 percent from their doctor or
 clinic.22 In one of the few studies of
 voluntariness conducted in the Unit
 ed States, researchers looking at ado
 lescents asked to consent to a research
 interview in an emergency room
 found that more than three-quarters
 of the subjects felt they had consented
 freely.23 Finally, a study of research
 participation among thirty prisoners
 showed only one who reported being
 threatened or forced to participate in
 a questionnaire study, and all felt that
 they had made the final decision
 themselves.24
 The impact of financial incentives
 has been examined by several research
 groups. A study of pharmacy students
 found that levels of both monetary
 incentives and risk influenced deci
 sions about hypothetical enrollment
 in a study. Also, when higher incen
 tives were at stake, these respondents
 indicated less willingness to tell inves
 tigators about restricted activities that
 might result in their exclusion from
 the protocol.25 A similar hypothetical
 study with subjects recruited from a
 hypertension clinic also showed an
 impact of risk and incentive levels on
 projected decisions, as well as an ef
 fect of a placebo condition.26 Neither
 study found that incentive levels had
 an impact on perceptions of risk, and
 both concluded that incentives influ
 enced but did not distort the deci
 sion-making process. Another study
 asking members of a jury pool to
 imagine the impact of a five hundred
 dollar incentive to participate in a
 study of antihypertensive medication,
 both on their decisions and on the
 decisions of other people, found that
 most respondents believed other peo
 ple would be influenced by the pay
 ment, but that they themselves would
 not be.27
 All of those studies were of sub
 jects faced with hypothetical choices.
 In the only set of in vivo experimental
 studies to date of which we are aware,
 investigators looked at the effect of a
 range of monetary incentives
 ($10-$ 160) on rates of follow-up by
 substance abusers. They concluded
 that although attendance at follow-up
 improved, there was no evidence that
 higher payments unduly influenced
 their decisions.28 Whether more sub
 stantial sums might have had a more
 problematic impact on their decision
 making is unknown.
 In sum, studies to date of volun
 tariness in research settings?al
 though they have contributed to our
 understanding of the complexities of
 the concept?leave substantial ques
 tions to be answered about the nature
 and extent of constraints on volun
 tariness, and in particular about the
 impact of offers and pressure on sub
 jects' perceptions and decisions. Em
 pirical data have contributed little to
 refining the concept of voluntariness
 or to fashioning reasonable public
 policy. Institutions and IRBs have
 therefore developed "rules of thumb"
 regarding such issues as the permissi
 ble incentive payments to subjects
 with little empirical footing, and ap
 parently with substantial variation.29
 If this situation is to change, a good
 starting point would be to develop a
 clearer model of voluntariness and a
 typology of the ways in which it may
 be impaired.
 Conceptualizing Voluntariness
 and Its Constraints
 Voluntariness has been the subject
 of inquiry in a variety of disci
 plines, including philosophy, cogni
 tive psychology, neuroscience, and
 law.30 Philosophy of mind has long
 been preoccupied with the question
 of how mental events can trigger
 physical acts, which would appear to
 be a prerequisite for voluntary ac
 tion.31 Psychological and neuro
 science studies in recent decades have
 challenged traditional notions of con
 scious control of behavior by identify
 ing unconscious mechanisms that ap
 pear to initiate action before a person
 is aware that an act is about to take
 place.32 In this view, rational explana
 tions for behavior are epiphenome
 nal?in other words, they reflect
 after-the-fact attempts to justify ac
 tions that are simply not susceptible
 to conscious control.
 Legal scholars and jurists, however,
 have generally taken a very different
 approach to conceptualizing volun
 tariness.33 The law to date has largely
 avoided the conundrum created by
 the recent findings regarding the pri
 mary role of unconscious determi
 nants of behavior?namely, that if no
 behavior is the product of conscious
 choice, then no act can be said to be
 voluntary?by focusing on whether a
 choice reflects the decision-making of
 the person in question, regardless of
 the process (conscious or uncon
 scious) by which the decision was
 reached. Thus, for legal purposes, a
 decision is presumed to be voluntary
 if no evidence exists that someone else
 has unduly influenced it or coerced
 the person deciding. This approach is
 reflected in many areas of law. The
 Restatement of Torts, an authoritative
 compilation of the principles of tort
 law, states the general legal rule that
 "consent is not effective if it is given
 under duress."34 Similarly, wills are
 invalid if the testator was subjected to
 undue influence,35 criminal confes
 sions are inadmissible if coerced,36
 and contracts entered into under
 duress are voidable.37 The Nuremberg
 decision explicated the requirement
 of voluntariness by insisting that the
 subject "should be so situated as to be
 able to exercise free power of choice,
 without the intervention of any ele
 ment of force, fraud, deceit, duress,
 over-reaching, or other ulterior form
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 of constraint or coercion."38 There
 has been a remarkable paucity of liti
 gation that tests this principle in the
 context of informed consent, but
 commentators are agreed on the gen
 eral rule.39
 That a decision is based on the
 choice of the research subject himself
 or herself, however, does not mean
 that it cannot be influenced by a vari
 ety of factors, including preexisting
 characteristics of the individual decid
 ing, aspects of his or her situation,
 and the desires and actions of third
 parties. Indeed, it would be difficult
 to envision a decision that is com
 pletely uninfluenced by any of these
 factors, and in any event the law does
 not require this.40
 Common influences on the deci
 sions of research subjects regarding
 The presence of influences does not mean that a decision is
 not voluntary. A decision is involuntary only if it is subject
 to a particular type of influence that is external,
 intentional, illegitimate, and causally linked to the choice
 of the research subject.
 participation in studies include the
 subjects preexisting values and prefer
 ences (for example, altruistic impulses
 to advance knowledge of a particular
 disorder or treatment), his or her psy
 chological state (for example, despera
 tion at a lack of treatment options for
 a life-threatening condition), legal
 pressures (for example, a court order
 for a substance abuser to get treat
 ment that can be satisfied only in a re
 search context), the opinions of oth
 ers (such as physicians and family),
 and available resources (for example,
 lack of health insurance coverage,
 leading a patient to consider free
 treatment as part of a research
 study).41 Additional considerations?
 such as an expectation of medical
 benefit, financial and other incen
 tives, and curiosity about the process
 and outcome of a research study?
 may also influence subjects' deci
 sions.42 However, none of these influ
 ences necessarily means that a deci
 sion to participate in research is not
 voluntary.
 Rather, as implied by the bodies of
 law noted above and as reflected in
 the Nuremberg tribunals judgment, a
 decision is involuntary only if it is
 subject to a particular type of influ
 ence that is external, intentional, ille
 gitimate, and causally linked to the
 choice of the research subject. By ex
 ternal, we mean that the influence
 must come from outside the person.
 Internal determinants such as confu
 sion, fear, or unreasonable hope may
 result in a decision that is incompe
 tent or unwise, but they do not ren
 der a choice involuntary.43 This prin
 ciple is exemplified in a U.S. Supreme
 Court ruling upholding the confes
 sion of a defendant who argued that
 he had been coerced by hallucinatory
 voices telling him that he should con
 fess to a murder because he offered no
 evidence that the police had engaged
 in coercive behavior.44
 However, even external influences
 do not negate voluntariness unless
 they are intentional. That is, they
 must result from the deliberate action
 of another person who intends to in
 fluence a subject's choice. Situational
 constraints?such as poverty, the lack
 of alternative treatment options, or
 the organizational culture of an insti
 tution or workplace?may have a
 profound influence on subject choice,
 but with the possible exception of
 some extraordinary cases, they do not
 make the choice involuntary.45 Were
 we to conclude otherwise, vast num
 bers of people (including all poor
 people and all academic medical cen
 ter employees) would be excluded
 from making decisions about research
 participation?a conclusion incom
 patible with our society's general
 commitment to the autonomy of the
 individual.46 However, situational
 constraints may set the stage for in
 tentional efforts to influence deci
 sions (including intentional manipu
 lation of the situation created by the
 constraints) and may make intention
 al efforts both easier to engage in and
 harder to detect in certain contexts,
 such as in hierarchical organizations,
 prisons, and other "total" institutions
 that control all aspects of a person's
 life.47
 Of course, many people intention
 ally influence the treatment or re
 search decisions of others. Physicians
 encourage patients to consent to re
 search studies, and family members
 may urge potential research subjects
 not to enroll in a clinical trial. The
 impact of such influences on volun
 tariness is not of concern unless these
 influences are also illegitimate?that
 is, the person exerting the influence
 does not have the right to act in this
 way according to generally accepted
 moral norms. A spouse may have the
 right to say, "Unless you get treat
 ment for your drinking problem by
 entering this research study, I'm leav
 ing," since spouses are generally free
 to terminate marital relationships and
 are given considerable latitude in in
 fluencing each other's behavior.48 A
 treating physician, however, does not
 have the right to say, "Unless you
 agree to enter this research project, I
 will no longer care for you"; having
 assumed responsibility for a patient's
 care, the physician owes a duty of fi
 delity to the patient's interests.
 Finally, to invalidate a decision, an
 influence must be causally linked to
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 the subject's choice. If a person exerts
 illegitimate external pressure on a
 subject to consent to research partici
 pation when the person was inclined
 to participate anyway and intended to
 accept the offer, the voluntariness of
 the subject's decision is not negated.
 Applying such pressure may be repre
 hensible, but since it is not causally
 related to the decision, it does not
 render the decision involuntary. As a
 corollary, the mere fact that an influ
 ence affects a subject's decision does
 not mean the decision is involuntary,
 so long as the influence was internal,
 unintentional, or legitimate.
 This conceptualization of volun
 tariness and the circumstances that
 negate it is in most respects compati
 ble with the formulation that Ruth
 Faden and Tom Beauchamp intro
 duced twenty years ago in their dis
 cussion of the related concept of coer
 cion.49 It differs markedly, however,
 from the approach of Laura Weiss
 Roberts, who defines what she calls
 "voluntarism" as "ideally encompass
 ing the individual's ability to act in
 accordance with one's authentic sense
 of what is good, right, and best in
 light of one's situation, values, and
 prior history."50 In Roberts's view, a
 subject's developmental stage, illness
 related symptoms, psychological is
 sues, and cultural and religious values,
 as well as the complexity of the deci
 sion and a variety of contextual fac
 tors, can all limit voluntarism. Based
 on a view of decision-making that
 posits an "authentic" choice existing
 independently of the varied influ
 ences that impact a person at any
 point in time, this formulation does
 not reflect the law of informed con
 sent and could not be implemented
 in a research setting.
 Constraints on Voluntariness
 in Research Settings
 How can we categorize the types of behaviors that may render a
 decision about research participation
 involuntary? Our classification of
 such constraints draws from the work
 of sociologist Talcott Parsons, who
 conceptualized the mechanisms by
 which one person can exert influence
 on the decisions of another.51 Parsons
 noted four means by which influence
 may be exercised: appeal to shared
 values, inducement, persuasion, and
 force (which Parsons called "deter
 rence").52 In the context of research,
 the influence of shared values may be
 exemplified by appeals to the impulse
 for altruism, inducement by offers to
 provide incentives, persuasion by the
 application of interpersonal pressure
 or by an exhortation to self-interest or
 community norms, and force by non
 consensual intervention or the is
 suance of threats. Appeals to common
 values, if honestly framed, are unlike
 ly to constitute illegitimate con
 straints on choice, but the other cate
 gories can be more problematic.
 Inducement to enter a research
 project will usually involve an offer.
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines
 offers as "expression [s] of intention or
 willingness to give or do something if
 desired"; in the decision whether to
 enter research, they are typically
 promises to provide a benefit to
 which a person is not otherwise enti
 tled. Although offers are external, in
 tentional efforts to influence a per
 son's behavior, insofar as they expand
 a person's options without constrain
 ing choice (since people are free to
 choose whether to accept an offer),
 they are usually legitimate and do not
 render a decision involuntary.53 Re
 searchers commonly offer incentives
 to potential subjects, including
 money, free medical care or medica
 tion, and more intensive follow-up or
 diagnostic procedures.54 For socially
 isolated subjects, the prospect of regu
 lar, supportive human contact as part
 of research participation may in itself
 constitute a significant offer. Indeed,
 the attractions of participating in a
 given study?that is, the nature of the
 offer?may differ depending on the
 subject's situation and perspective.
 The prospect of a lengthy hospitaliza
 tion might be a disincentive for some
 subjects yet constitute an appealing
 offer to others.
 An example drawn from our re
 cent study of voluntariness of consent
 to research will help make this point
 clear. We interviewed eighty-eight
 participants in a variety of clinical tri
 als at a major academic medical cen
 ter. Consider a thirty-eight-year-old
 man who was interviewed shortly
 after agreeing to participate in a study
 of treatment for cocaine abuse. After
 using cocaine for roughly a decade, he
 was kicked out of the house by the
 mother of his daughter and had been
 rotating his residence among a num
 ber of friends. He saw the study,
 which involved several weeks of hos
 pitalization, as a way to get out of his
 current situation?a time to change
 locations and to clear his head. Since
 he had been unemployed for the past
 five years, he was also attracted by the
 prospect of receiving $1,100 for his
 participation.
 Offers, however, may not be en
 tirely unproblematic. If an offer is
 substantial enough to undermine a
 person's decision-making process?in
 other words, if it leads a person to ig
 nore or undervalue the risks of re
 search participation?most commen
 tators (with some exceptions55) would
 consider the offer to be exerting
 undue influence, and hence illegiti
 mate. There is no consensus regarding
 the point at which an offer crosses
 that threshold; indeed, there is proba
 bly no universally valid way of identi
 fying such a point since, for any indi
 vidual, it will vary depending on fi
 nancial status, health insurance, ac
 cess to alternative treatments, and
 other considerations. Thus, determin
 ing the possible subject's own per
 spective is essential, even though
 prospective review of research proto
 cols inevitably depends on estimating
 the likely responses of reasonable per
 sons in the anticipated situations of
 the study's subject pool. Investigators,
 IRB members, and bioethicists ex
 pend a good deal of effort defining
 the acceptable limits of offers for re
 search projects. But, even after the
 fact, since subjects often have a vari
 ety of reasons for enrolling in a study,
 it can be difficult to determine
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 whether an incentive has induced
 them unduly.
 As another example, consider a
 forty-two-year-old unemployed man
 who, eight weeks into a study of treat
 ment for opiate abuse, rated the five
 hundred dollars that he would receive
 over the course of a year as the most
 important factor in his decision to
 participate. He gave the study a score
 of five on a ten-point scale gauging
 risk and discomfort, noting that at
 times he'd had a bad reaction to the
 medication, including rashes. Howev
 er, the money he would receive played
 a significant role in making it worth
 while to accept these adverse effects.
 But he also cited getting badly needed
 help for his addiction, free treatment,
 and the reputation of the treatment
 An assessment of voluntariness might begin with a general
 inquiry into the motivations for a person's decision. The evaluator
 will want to pay particular attention to external and
 intentional influences that are most likely to impair the
 voluntariness of consent.
 II
 facility, among other factors, as hav
 ing a substantial effect on his deci
 sion.
 Persuasion, as Parsons uses the
 term, can involve appeals to self-inter
 est (for example, "If you agree to this
 innovative surgical trial, you may heal
 and be back at work more quickly" or
 "If you enter this clinical trial, you
 may receive a new medication not yet
 generally available that may be more
 efficacious for your condition than
 current treatments."). Appeals to self
 interest usually do not constrain vol
 untary choice and, if accurate in their
 claims, are not otherwise problematic.
 A second variant of persuasion, which
 may be more problematic, is the use
 of pressure (analogous to what Faden
 and Beauchamp refer to as "psycho
 logical manipulation").56 Drawing
 again from the Oxford English Dictio
 nary, to apply pressure is "to urge or
 press strongly . . . ; to apply influence
 or psychological force." In the context
 of the decision to enroll in a trial,
 "pressure" means the application of
 psychological influence over time,
 within a relationship, in an attempt to
 influence a person's decision. Not all
 kinds of pressure negate the volun
 tariness of consent, though they may
 be more likely to do so than offers.
 Like an offer, pressure can be
 thought of as undue influence if it is
 illegitimate and causally related to the
 decision. Pressure can be interperson
 al (for example, a physician repeated
 ly urging a patient to sign up for a
 study in which the patient clearly
 does not want to participate57) or or
 ganizational (for example, a hospital
 defining expectations that patients
 will participate in research). It can
 emanate from within or outside the
 health care system. The closer the re
 lationship between a person and a po
 tential subject, and the more depen
 dent the potential subject is on that
 person, the more likely pressure is to
 be effective.
 Pressure is probably the most com
 mon behavior that constrains the vol
 untariness of decision-making in re
 search. The following scenario from
 our research demonstrated the com
 plexity of determining the effects of
 pressure: when a thirty-six-year-old
 man's boss suggested that he partici
 pate in a treatment study for his sub
 stance abuse, the subject felt pres
 sured into enrolling. He rated the
 pressure as moderately important
 (five on a scale of ten) and moderate
 ly unfair (also five on a scale of ten).
 But he admitted that he needed help
 for his addiction, saying that half of
 his motivation was internal and only
 half was to please his boss. He also de
 scribed himself as extremely pleased
 to be in the study.
 Pressure can also be exerted in the
 opposite direction?that is, to dis
 courage potential subjects from en
 rolling in research. For example, a
 thirty-seven-year-old woman who
 was enrolled in a drug abuse treat
 ment study broke into tears while de
 scribing how her Alcoholics Anony
 mous sponsor had pressured her not
 to enroll, saying that it was not the
 kind of help she needed. The subject
 characterized the pressure as "wrong,
 unfair, close-minded, and stupid,"
 but reported that in the end it did not
 affect her decision, which she believed
 she had made in a completely volun
 tary fashion.
 Parsons' final category of influence
 involves the application of force. In
 the doctor-patient relationship, force
 may be exerted through nonconsen
 sual research participation?that is,
 enrolling a person in research without
 that person's consent?including sur
 reptitious involvement (such as ad
 ministering a study medication in
 food without the person's knowledge)
 or threats (such as telling a very ill pa
 tient that he or she will be discharged
 from the hospital unless he or she
 consents to participate in the study).
 Threats are declarations of intent to
 take action detrimental to another,
 contingent on that persons failure to
 behave in the manner desired by the
 individual or entity making the
 threat.
 Nonconsensual research involve
 ment may be nonvoluntary, but is not
 necessarily /^voluntary (as defined
 above) if the patient is not competent
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 to make a decision, since such inter
 ventions may reflect legitimate choic
 es made by appropriate surrogates. As
 with pressure, threats can come from
 clinicians, researchers, or from others
 who are significant to potential sub
 jects. When used by clinicians or re
 searchers to induce participation,
 threats are generally viewed as illegiti
 mate. However, the same may not be
 true of threats made by other people
 in subjects' lives. A family member,
 for example, may have the right to
 make certain demands on a patient
 that a medical professional or re
 searcher could not. The legitimacy of
 those threats can often be difficult to
 determine. For example, a substance
 abuse researcher reported that the
 family of one of his subjects told him
 that if he didn't participate in the
 study?which provided free treat
 ment for addiction?then he couldn't
 live at home anymore. Their intent
 was to get him into treatment for his
 addiction in an available and afford
 able program. The subject was al
 lowed to enroll in the research pro
 ject.
 A final component of this concep
 tualization of voluntariness is the
 recognition that constraints on deci
 sion-making can be either actual or
 perceived. Actual offers, pressure, or
 threats reflect the behavior of other
 people who are trying to affect the
 subject's decision. Previous studies of
 limits to voluntariness in the context
 of psychiatric hospitalization, howev
 er, have suggested that there is often a
 marked difference between the behav
 iors of others and a subject's percep
 tion of those behaviors.58 Hence,
 both actual and perceived constraints
 are relevant. For example, a threat
 may be made in an attempt to coerce
 someone to perform an action?like
 join a research project?but the sub
 ject of the threat may not perceive
 herself as experiencing coercion, per
 haps because she does not believe that
 the threat will be carried out. Con
 versely, a person may experience pres
 sure when no pressure has been ap
 plied. For example, a person may be
 lieve that his physician will be angry
 with him for failing to enter a re
 search project, even though the physi
 cian is actually indifferent to whether
 he enters the project. Although per
 ceived constraint in the absence of in
 tentional behavior may not render a
 choice legally involuntary (based as it
 is on the subject's own mispercep
 tion), it may still be problematic from
 an ethical perspective, since the sub
 ject will be making a decision that
 cannot be said to reflect an informed
 choice. Thus, investigators may want
 to monitor for and correct such mis
 perceptions prior to obtaining con
 sent.
 A Research Agenda on
 Voluntariness
 A prerequisite for further research
 on voluntariness is to develop re
 liable and valid methods of assessing
 when constraints on voluntariness are
 present. That will require, in turn, a
 complete understanding of the nature
 of such constraints?including a
 method to detect their presence and,
 if necessary, to measure them quanti
 tatively?and ways to put the result
 ing knowledge into practice. Given
 the potentially different implications
 of actual and perceived coercion and
 undue influence, developing ways of
 assessing both would be helpful.
 Reliable assessment techniques
 would also open the door to studies
 of the epidemiology of constraints on
 voluntariness. In what types of stud
 ies, with which kinds of people, suf
 fering from what categories of disor
 ders are problems with voluntariness
 most likely to arise? How well does
 the reality of voluntariness match the
 assumptions found in the bioethics
 literature and the underlying regula
 tion of researchers' practices? Is lack
 of voluntariness more of a problem in
 "total" institutions, such as prisons? Is
 it more likely to manifest in certain
 groups of vulnerable people, such as
 children, pregnant women, drug
 abusers, subjects recruited by their
 own physicians, people with mental
 disabilities, and people who are edu
 cationally and economically disad
 vantaged, particularly those without
 other access to medical care? To what
 extent and at what point do incen
 tives have the feared effects on sub
 jects' choices?
 As answers to these questions
 begin to be available?and assuming
 that problematic areas of activity can
 be identified?a new set of issues
 with regard to preventing actual and
 perceived threats to voluntariness can
 be explored. What kind of education
 may be helpful for investigators and
 their staff? Which of the regulatory
 options available to IRBs (like caps
 on incentives or the use of consent
 monitors) are likely to be effective,
 and which are most cost-effective,
 taking into account the impact on the
 research projects themselves? To the
 extent that subjects may misinterpret
 clinicians' or researchers' behavior as
 constituting pressure or threats, what
 interventions may be helpful in clari
 fying the situation?
 Assessing Voluntariness in the
 Research Setting
 Like decisional competence, the voluntariness of decisions?in
 cluding decisions to consent to re
 search?is presumed by law unless ev
 idence is presented that it has been il
 legitimately constrained. When ques
 tions arise about constraints on a sub
 ject's voluntariness, investigators may
 be at a loss to know how to structure
 their assessment. The most widely
 used instrument to measure patients'
 perceptions of coercion is the
 MacArthur Perceived Coercion Scale
 (PCS), a brief, five-item question
 naire. Even though the PCS was orig
 inally developed and tested in the
 context of consent to psychiatric hos
 pitalization, a slightly modified ver
 sion of this questionnaire may be
 helpful to uncover the extent to
 which subjects believe that their deci
 sions are not their own,59 and our ex
 perience suggests that this modified
 version can also be useful in research
 consent settings. But the PCS is not
 designed to probe the nature of the
 influences on respondents' decisions
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 or their legitimacy, and at the mo
 ment there is no validated assessment
 tool to assist in the process.
 The conceptualization of volun
 tariness offered above may be helpful
 here. An assessment of voluntariness
 might begin with a general inquiry
 into the motivations for a person's de
 cision about enrolling in research?
 with questions such as, "WTiat made
 you decide to participate in the re
 search project?" From the list of mo
 tives that most people will offer, the
 evaluator will want to pay particular
 attention to external and intentional
 influences that are most likely to im
 pair the voluntariness of consent.
 Having identified these, the next step
 will be to assess their legitimacy. As
 noted above, pressure and threats by
 health care professionals will generally
 be problematic, but the same is not
 true for all people in the potential
 subject's life. However, not all pres
 sure or threats from family members
 or friends are necessarily legitimate.
 For example, a threat to withhold the
 patient's Social Security disability
 check unless she agrees to enter a
 study is clearly unacceptable. Because
 of this, the nature of these actions
 must be carefully explored. Finally,
 the assessor will want to determine
 the extent to which they may have af
 fected the ultimate decision of the
 subject.
 As the examples above show, vol
 untariness occurs along a spectrum.
 Since subjects more often than not
 offer multiple reasons for enrollment,
 drawing a line between voluntary and
 involuntary actions is often not easy.
 Part of the challenge involves ascer
 taining the extent to which subjects'
 decisions were affected by offers, pres
 sure, or threats. Additional dilemmas
 stem from the need to determine the
 legitimacy of those behaviors. We
 should keep in mind that our legal
 system presumes voluntariness of
 choice, and that this presumption
 should be overturned only in cases in
 which the four criteria for rendering
 decisions involuntary are clearly met.
 Sometimes subjects may perceive
 themselves to be pressured or threat
 ened when, in fact, they are not. Pa
 tients, for example, may believe that
 physicians will dislike them and be
 less attentive if they reject proffered
 study participation, or that they will
 be discharged from their physicians'
 care altogether. Clarifying the situa
 tion may free patients to make truly
 voluntary decisions. If illegitimate
 pressure is really present or threats re
 ally have been made, it may be neces
 sary to seek administrative interven
 tions. Intrafamilial conflict over re
 search choices may be resolved by
 bringing in key family members for a
 group meeting with the person and
 responsible researchers, at which is
 sues can be explored and appropriate
 parameters outlined for family mem
 bers' involvement.
 In practice, research settings gener
 ally deal with the assessment of po
 tential threats to voluntariness on a
 prospective basis, as specified by the
 federal regulations. As noted above,
 IRBs are encouraged to consider re
 quiring special protections for groups
 whose decisions might be rendered
 involuntary by offers, pressure, or
 threats.60 This prospective regulation
 of the consent process, in contrast to
 what transpires in the ordinary clini
 cal setting, is based on the assump
 tion that whereas medical treatment
 is intended to promote the patient's
 best interests, research is designed pri
 marily to produce generalizable data,
 and the likelihood that subjects will
 benefit is highly variable. Among
 other possible approaches, when sub
 jects are believed vulnerable to im
 paired voluntariness, IRBs may ap
 point "consent monitors" to observe
 the consent process and to determine
 that subjects are giving voluntary
 consent.61 To our knowledge, the util
 ity of such monitors has not yet been
 studied. Other approaches to protect
 ing voluntariness should be explored
 as well.
 Our conceptualization is drawn
 from the approach to voluntariness
 taken by the legal doctrine of in
 formed consent, with its focus on as
 sessing objective behaviors of re
 searchers and their impact on sub
 jects' decisions. WTiether consent is
 voluntary, therefore, depends on the
 extent to which subjects are actually
 exposed to external, intentional, and
 illegitimate influences that causally
 impact their decisions. The regulatory
 structure surrounding human sub
 jects research, and the reality that
 challenges to the validity of consent
 will ultimately be resolved in the
 courts, combine to support this ap
 proach.
 But voluntary decisions are not
 necessarily optimal ones, since they
 may still be uninformed or unwise, or
 made in the mistaken belief that ex
 ternal constraints exist. Hence, explo
 ration of ways to maximize subjects'
 informed participation in decisions
 about research remains important.
 However, a clearer conceptualization
 of voluntariness, rooted in the law of
 informed consent, should help to ad
 vance scholarship, research, and prac
 tice on those aspects of researchers'
 behavior that may compromise vol
 untary consent in research settings or
 be perceived by subjects as having
 done so.
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